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Moldova: To Be or Not to Be
Establishing a National Identity
Before and After Independence:
1989-1993
Brittney Grandy

The difference between a nation and a nationality is clear, but it is not always
observed. Likeness between members is the essence of nationality, but the members of a nation may be very different. A nation may be composed of many
nationalities . ..
-Louis D. Brandeis (1915)
This difference is all too clear in the former Soviet satellite of Moldova. In 1989,
Moldova had a population of 4,335,360 (,21,eMOCKon Weekly 2013), with a variety of
nationalities living within its borders that threatened to divide the state. Moldovans
were the largest ethnic group, accounting for roughly 65 percent of the population.
Ukrainians (13.8 percent), Russians (13 percent), Gaguaz (3.5 percent), and Romanians (0.06 percent) were just a few of the other ethnic minorities (,21,eMocxon Weekly
2013). While other former Soviet states dealt relatively effectively with a variety of
ethnic minorities within their borders, this issue tore at the very foundation of Moldova's national identity, exacerbating tensions between groups vying for control over
what Moldova would become. From what language was to be spoken to the national
anthem, Moldovans struggled both pre- and post-independence to develop a strong
sense of distinct national identity. Some groups pressed for unification with Romania,
a neighboring state with strong historical and cultural ties to Moldova, while others
asserted Moldova was uniquely its own country. Not to be left out, others desired
to maintain ties to the former Soviet Union. This paper will examine the struggle
Moldovans underwent in deciding whether to strengthen ties with the former Soviet
Union, to return to old Romanian ties, or to create their own independent nation.
Additional insights into the depth of this issue can be learned by comparing Moldova
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to the Baltic States. The Baltic region avoided a similar identity crisis in part through
its fortune of having strong ties with Western Europe, which motivated and enabled
the Baltic region to depart from the former Soviet Union economically, politically, and
culturally. The Baltic States also lacked the same type of ties that Moldova had with
Romania before the Soviet era. Moldova's misfortune may have been avoided had it
had similar ties to pro-independence Western states as the Baltic region experienced
rather than its mixed history of ties with Russia and Romania.

A Brief History
From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the Moldovan landscape had frequently been the subject of dispute and war between rival powers, such as the Ottoman
Empire and Russia. Bessarabia, a region widely encompassed by what is currently Moldova and part of Ukraine, was annexed by tsarist Russia in 1812. In 1918, Bessarabia
declared its independence from Russia, though not before undergoing years of intensive Russification. At the time, Bessarabia's parliament called for unification with
neighboring Romania, a move recognized by the 1920 Treaty of Paris. The Bolsheviks
who had just come to power in Russia, however, did not support the action. Just
four years later, the land east of the Dniester River was founded as the Moldovan
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. During this time period, "Soviet Moldovan historiography downplayed any historical ties to Romania and exaggerated
Bessarabia's Slavic ties" (Kuzio 2002). The USSR focused on differentiating Moldovans from Romanians, and although during World War II a Nazi attack against the
Soviets enabled a Romanian puppet regime to be established in the Moldova Soviet
Socialist Republic, it was quickly ousted when the USSR reclaimed control shortly
before the war came to an end. During the Soviet era, Moldova had essentially only
one political party: the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM). During the 1%0s,
when the party began to move away from bilingualism, Moldovan intellectual
elites protested this dilution of their ethnicity but were met with harsh retaliation
(Kulik 2005). In the late 1%0s and into the 1970s, Moldovan students formed "an
illegal anti-Soviet political organization" to infiltrate the CPM and Soviet institutions in order to introduce policies that better fit the republic, but the movement
was essentially brought to a halt when its leader, Soltoianu, was taken into custody, sent into exile, and locked in correction camps for nearly two decades (Kulik
2005). Soviet authorities employed various means and organizations, including the
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD-later renamed the Committee
for State Security, or KGB), to accentuate the differences between Romanians and
Moldovans. One method involved physically removing citizens who supported
ties with Romania, labeling them the "enemies of the people" (Bugai 1999). PanRomanian supporters were persecuted and deprived of their right to vote, bringing
about a loss of social benefits such as rationing (Bugai 1999). The USSR enforced the
use of Cyrillic script rather than Romania's Latin script. Reference to the "Romanian" language was strictly prohibited; the USSR espoused the language as being
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"Moldovan" (King 2000). Greater opportunities and privileges were given to the
Russian speakers in Moldova, including access to better social services, careers, and
educational opportunities Oenkins 1997).
Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of glasnost or "openness" brought about a resurrection of Moldovan nationalism in the late 1980s, as it "provoked an open debate
about the country's language issue and alphabet issue, the cultural and political
underpinnings of which gave the first impulse to Moldova's struggle for independence and emancipation from the USSR" (Brezianu 2010). This era and its reforms
under perestroika, namely the introduction of the Congress of People's Deputies and
Supreme Soviet in each republic, allowed for the formation of the Popular Front of
Moldova (FPM), a "Moldovan" (but truly pro-Romanian) independence movement
that took control of parliament from the communists and brought about changes that
would take even greater effect after independence was acquired (Fedor 1995).

Independence: Further Separation from the Soviet Union
On 27 August 1991, Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union,
but this new-found freedom did not come easily or provide stability. After gaining
autonomy, Moldova was immediately faced with the need to reconstruct its postSoviet economy, mediate internal conflicts, and create political institutions that would
incorporate and defend the state's many ethnic minorities (Rossi 2011). That same
month, the Communist Party was formally banned from Moldova, though some
former communist members continued to be involved in politics by joining other
successor organizations that were established in September through the "Law on Parties and Other Socio-Political Organizations" that provided for a multiparty system
(Kulik 2005). However, these parties, along with parliament on a whole, were not
particularly politically powerful and were wracked with internal fragmentation and
inexperience (Kulik 2005). There was also a divide in the populace on the meaning
of independence between "large segments of the minority and titular ethnic groups,
which supported the preservation of the Soviet Union ... [and] a substantial portion
of the titular groups' political and cultural elite, which saw unification with Romania
as the ultimate goal of Moldova's political transformation" (Lavorschi 2012). Having
ties to both the Soviet Union and Romania, Moldova's independence movement triggered a game of tug-of-war as varying factions within the government vied for influence and control over Moldova (Lavorschi 2012). One observer explained the basis of
this struggle as follows:
Unlike the other constituents of the Soviet Union, Moldova was the only union
republic whose majority population was culturally bound to a nation-state across
the border and therefore the potential object of irredentism, a situation that simply replayed within the socialist camp an older confrontation between the
Romanian kingdom and the Russian empire. For this reason, the Moldovans
have long been the object of intense nation-building projects, designed either to
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convince them of their separateness from the Romanians or, when under Romanian rule, to convince them that their purported separateness was a fiction of
Russian propaganda . .. . (King 2000)
Given their history of being subjected to intense nation-building projects, it is not
surprising that Moldovans struggled to establish their national identity upon gaining independence.

Further Division: Moldovanism versus Romanianism
Due to Moldova's weak national identity, citizens struggled to choose between
supporting Moldovanism or Romanianism. While there was support of ties to the
former Soviet Union, these were prevalent only among small groups of Russian
nationalists that lived in the country and will be discussed later. Even during the
Soviet era, the two larger movements created deep divides "throughout the 30s,
[as] the MASSR administrative and intellectual elites [became] the battleground of
an increasingly fierce fight, both symbolically and administratively, between two
camps ... who got their names from their respective positions on the issue of the
national language of the Republic" (Negura 2012). The third camp that advocated
for the maintenance of the Soviet system will be discussed in greater detail with the
issue of Transnistrian independence (Kulik 2005). Each of these three groups established its own center: Bucharest for Romanianists, Chisinau (the capital of Moldova) for Moldovanists, and Moscow for Soviet/Russian supporters.
Moldovanism developed greater support amongst the communists, ethnic Moldovan peasants, and minority groups (Iglesias 2013). Romanianism, on the other
hand, had its roots in the late 1980s glasnost period and was most widely supported
by the educated and urban elites. Romanianists were supporters of the Moldovan
Populist Front (Fedor 1995). Fundamental issues---culture, language, religion, and
history-divided Moldovanists from Romanianists. Moldovanism argued that these
elements were unique and distinctly separate from Romanian culture, language, religion, and history. Indeed, after years of Soviet Union reassurances that the two states
were in fact different, such claims seemed to be completely legitimate to this group of
citizens. On the other hand, Romanianism promoted greater independence from the
Soviet structure and sought reunification with Romania. It emphasized the numerous
similarities between the two cultures, including their Orthodox religions and similar
languages, viewing any differences as slight variations of the same Romanian history
and culture (Lavorschi 2012). While Moldovanism promoted its own distinct "Moldovan" language, Romanianism advocated for one that was essentially identical to
the speech and text in Romania.
By 1990, before gaining independence, the pro-Romanianism Popular Front
had secured 27 percent of the seats in the Supreme Soviet and, allied with reformist communists, was able to push its own policies regarding national identity and
language. The Popular Front garnered great support both in the capital and in the
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regions of Moldova dominated by ethnic Romanians (Fedor 1995). Though reunification with Romania was not favored by all, the cultural intelligentsia was "cut
off from the 80 percent of the population living in rural areas who maintain a parochial, local identity," which allowed these elites to push policies that did not always
reflect the larger population's desires (Kuzio 2002). Moreover, with considerable
control over parliament and government, the Popular Front succeeded in creating
a more pro-Romanian identity by adopting a national language, flag, and anthem
strikingly similar to Romania's, as well as celebrating national holidays that focused
on ties with Romania and a rejection of the Soviet Union.

The Push toward Romania: Language
The pro-Romanian Popular Front's success in promoting the reinstatement of
"national symbols of our people" after the government's adoption of the "On State
Sovereignty and Our Right to the Future" re-established Romanian as the official
language of Moldova (Eagles 2014). Latin script replaced Cyrillic and names that
had been "Russified" were changed back to their previous forms. During the Soviet
Union's reign Romanian had been replaced by Russian in practically all facets of
public life, but the new language law was quickly accepted throughout most of the
country, except for the Transnistrian and Gagauz regions inhabited by Russian and
Turkish minorities respectively (Chinn 1993). At the time of this change, Romanians
composed less than half of Chisinau, the capital. More than 12 percent considered
Russian to be their native language and 75 percent spoke Russian; however, only
11 percent of Russians in the city said they could proficiently speak Romanian (Guboglo 1990). Ethnic Russians feared this movement away from their Russian heritage,
leading, in part, to the Transnistrian crisis that followed shortly after independence.
The Flag
Not only did this new policy of promoting the "symbols of our people" make
Moldovan the sole official state language, but it also brought about the adoption of a
new flag. The flag of Moldova, created in 1990, includes a coat of arms that resembles
the Romanian coat of arms, depicting a golden eagle clutching in its beak an Orthodox Christian cross. Additionally, the Moldovan flag is based on Romanian national
colors----blue, yellow, and red-and the back of the flag does not feature the coat of

Romanian Flag and Coat of Arms

Moldovan Flag
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arms, making it even more similar to the Romanian flag itself. As the Romanian flag
was modified from its Soviet precursor through the elimination of the communist
emblem from its center as a symbol of its ousting of the Soviet regime, the new Moldovan flag also rejected communism and the Soviet regime and accepted its Romanian heritage (Eagles 2014).

National Anthem
Another symbol of"our people" that the Popular Front adopted was the national
anthem De~teaptit-te, romane!, which is also the national anthem of Romania. From
1917 to 1918 and then again from 1991 until 1994, Andrei Mure~anu's patriotic song
written during Romania's revolution of 1848 was used in Moldova despite the
implicit references it makes to being Romanian:
Wake up, Romanian, from your deadly sleep
Into which you've been sunk by the barbaric tyrants
Now, or never, your fate renew,
To which your enemies will bow.
(National Anthems Atom 2016)
Following decades of rule under the Soviet Union, the words of this anthem promote
independence from the ''barbaric tyrants" -the Communist Party and Soviet system.
The pro-Romanian movement did not care for subtleties concerning its alliance with
Romania and rejection of the USSR.

Holidays
Adopting Romanian holidays and ending commemoration of certain Soviet holidays helped forge a new national consciousness. A few of these holidays included the
"Anniversary of the October Revolution (November 7), Constitution Day (October 7),
Soviet Army Day (February 23), Komsomol Day (May 29), Pioneers' Day (May 19)
and Militia Day (November 10)" (BirlMeanu 2013). New holidays that celebrated ties
to Romania and independence, such as Language Day (August 31) as well as Independence Day (August 27), were then initiated, and religious holidays that had not
been included during the Soviet era, including Easter and Christmas, were observed
once more (Ibid.). Some Soviet holidays remained, including Women's Day (March
8), Labor Day (May 1), as well as Victory Day (May 9), but these were instead portrayed as Moldovan holidays (Ibid.).

Breakaway Regions: Resisting Romanianism
Parts of the country strongly objected to these policies. As mentioned, there
existed in Moldova a third movement separate from Moldovanism and Romanianism: those who were pro-Russia. In 1988, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Russians, and other
Russian-speaking minorities in Moldova formed the Yedinstvo-Unitatea Intermovement in response to the republic's attempts to move away from the Russian language
(Fedor 1995). Primarily based in Transnistria, the Yedinstvo party advocated "the pre80
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1990 status quo" of having Russian as the state's primary language (Fedor 1995 ). The
debate over the official state language instilled fear throughout the Russian-speaking
populace, and while the Popular Front held rallies and gathered over one million
signatures to support the proposed law change, Russians, Gagauzis, Ukrainians, and
other ethnic minorities viewed this as a serious threat, some of them choosing to flee
rather than face the economic and social effects of the language law:
Moldavia's politicians are moving as fast as they can to divest themselves of all
things Russian. The old Bessarabian part of Moldavia is fast becoming a de facto
little Romania and Russian-speakers, the "uninvited guests" as officials call them,
are being shown the door. Virtually all non-Romanian-speakers will have to pass
language tests by 1995 or lose their jobs. In several firms, testing has already begun.
Skilled Russians, Ukrainians and others are leaving. (Econamist 1991)
The language law enacted in 1989 did, however, provide some accommodations for Russian, guaranteeing its protection and use in communicating with other
Soviet republics as well as in interethnic communications within the republic (King
2000). The Gagauzi language was also guaranteed protection, and classes were
offered to help those who did not speak Moldovan to enable them to pass language
tests required for state employment (King 2000). Despite these provisions, the language law served as the catalyst for the two secessionist movements in Transnistria
and Gagauz (Chinn 1993). Russians and other minority groups went on strike in
response to the language change and the potential unification with Romania the
new law foreshadowed. During this time, the Yedinstvo party gained support in the
Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1990 and in local elections, giving it control over local
and raion (regional) Transnistrian governments. Closely allied with the Yedinstvo
party, the Gagauz Halki (Gagauz People) was another influential minority political party. Gagauz Halki won support in local government positions throughout
five raione and declared its sovereignty in 1990 (Fedor 1995). On 3 September 1990,
Transnistrian leaders also declared their separation from Moldova and claimed that
they had established the "Trans-Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic'' of the USSR
Oackson 2003). The Soviet government, and later the Russian government, provided aid to this breakaway group.
Fear of coerced cultural assimilation with Romania and disagreement with the
newly established leaders motivated Transnistrian and Gagauzi groups respectively
to press for secession (Iglesias 2013). While the first struggle was resolved diplomatically through the granting of autonomous status to the Gaguaz, the latter struggle
with the Transnistrian movement formed into a bloody civil war by 1992. The Russian
army assisted the Transnistria region to gain de facto independence, and today there
still remain Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria. At the time of the conflict, this issue
of Transnistrian independence further polarized the debate between the three major
movements: pro-Moldova, pro-Romania, and pro-Russia factions.
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The Fall of the Popular Front: A Move toward Moldovan Independence
A national survey conducted prior to the 1994 elections indicated that a majority
of Moldovans favored Chisinau as its national center rather than Bucharest or Moscow.
The pro-Romania Popular Front had lost support by early 1993 due to internal quarrels
and disputes, which resulted in the party's fragmentation into numerous opposing factions (Fedor 1995). Parliamentary elections held on 27 February 1994, produced majority
support for the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova with fifty-six of the 104 seats
and with twenty-eight seats for the Yedinstvo-Socialist Bloc (Fedor 1995). Pro-Romanian
parties, the Congress of Peasants and the Christian Democratic Popular Front, the main
factions of the former Popular Front, garnered only twenty seats combined (Fedor 1995).
The new government served as a mediator between the ethnic Slavs and the ethnic
Romanians and enacted more moderate laws throughout the country. Problems such
as the secessionist movement in Transnistria were faced with new optimism "without
a majority of Popular Front extreme nationalists in Parliament" (Fedor 1995). Changes
in the "symbols of our people" included a new national anthem, Limbanoastra, which
reflected separation from Romania. Devoid of implicit references to Romanians, the
song, written in 1917, a year before Bessarabia united with Romania, hails "a people suddenly awaken from the sleep of death" (National Anthems Atom 2016). Moldova experienced another "awakening" from death as it shifted away from a pro-Romania stance
to one more temperate and suited to the needs of its people. On 27 August 1994, a new
constitution granted Transnistria and the Gaguaz Republic significant autonomy but
still upheld Moldova's sovereignty and identity (Fedor 1995). Gagauz, for example, did
not have territorial autonomy but was allowed cultural, economic, and administrative
independence and could elect a regional legislative assembly that chose a "guvernator"
to serve as a member in the Moldovan government (Fedor 1995). Conflict with Transnistria continued until 1992. Following the three-month Moldova-Transnistria War
from March until June, a multilateral peacekeeping force helped resolve the conflict,
ultimately granting Transnistria de facto independence (Jackson 2003).
In the end, the Popular Front lost support not only because its policies served as
a catalyst for secession movements within the country, further polarizing public opinion, but also because the pro-Romania movement caused Moldovans to grow "suspicious of and hostile towards" possible unification with Romania (Jackson 2003).
Additionally, Romania had little economic support to offer Moldova (Jackson
2003). The possibility of reunification had brought increased ethnic conflicts, and
Romania's slow efforts to democratize appeared a potential threat to Moldova's
own political future Uackson 2003). Moldovans had not only ousted the Popular
Front, but on 6 March 1994, they produced a referendum decisively rejecting unification with Romania Uackson 2003).

Formation of National Identity in Other Former Soviet States
Unlike Moldova, some former Soviet states, such as the Baltic States, quickly and
easily established national identities after gaining independence-though no transi82
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tion from the Soviet era for the former satellites can truly be labeled quick or easy.
Although Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia also had ethnic Russian minorities within
their borders, their treatment of Russians enabled them to overcome secessionist
movements like the Transnistria conflict in Moldova. These countries also had connections to non-Russian states prior to the Soviet occupation-as Moldova did with
Romania-and these strong historical, geographic, and cultural ties to Western Europe
enabled them to quickly break away from the former Soviet Union and establish independent national identities. Yet, despite these strong ties with Western Europe, they
did not experience the same push for unification with any of these countries, including Germany, as each of the Baltic States had previously declared its independence
in 1918, before the Soviet occupation. Moldova's past showed that before becoming
part of the USSR, the state had united with Romania, thus upon independence in 1991
many felt that this union should be restored.
With strong German heritages that caused them to view Slavs as a lesser race,
the Baltic States more successfully resisted Russification efforts than many other
Soviet republics as they both feared and detested Russia and the Soviet Union
(Kurth 1999). Their close proximity to Scandinavian and Western states provided
them examples of nationalist movements during the nineteenth century. In particular, during the 1980s, the "political integration of the Baltic republics into the Soviet
Union was seriously challenged, as the influences emanating from the Polish social
experiment proved to be a catalyst for nationalist activities" (Panagoitou 2001).
Moldova's close proximity with Romania provided it with momentum for reunification. The Baltic's favorable geographic location also facilitated the establishment
of economic and political ties with countries other than Russia at the end of the
twentieth century (Panagoitou 2001 ). In comparison, Romania's poor economy and
its struggle with democratization threatened Moldova's own chances for economic
and political success were the two to unite, making the decision of reunification an
even more difficult choice.
Within the Baltics, not only was Latin script used instead of Cyrillic, the languages also differed significantly from Russian, making ethnic Russians less likely to
learn these languages. Additionally, while the Soviet Union focused on reconstruction
after WWII, particularly after having regained the Baltics from Germany, which had
taken control of it temporarily from 1941 until 1945, the lack of resources for developing the Russian language in the Baltics meant that for a time schools were conducted in
the native languages of these countries, "but an additional year was added to secondary school time scale to provide extra time for Russian-language acquisition," further enabling the Baltics to retain their sense of national identity (Grenoble 2003).
Moldova's Russification process did not face the same obstacle and was able to take
deeper roots in the country. On the whole, the strong influence of Western Europe and
the weak ties to the Soviet Union and Russia provided clear direction for the Baltics
following independence.
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To aid in the process of turning West, Estonia and Latvia adopted restrictive citizenship and language laws. Lithuania, however, like many other former Soviet states,
granted citizenship to essentially everyone living within its borders as it had a
mere 10 percent of its population consisting of Slavs, while Estonia had roughly
35 percent and Latvia around 39 percent (Thompson 2012). Estonia granted citizenship only to people who lived in the country prior to 1940-before the USSR took
control of the state-ensuring that a large majority of Russians did not qualify
for citizenship. If a person had moved to Estonia or Latvia after 1940, they were
required to pass a language test and had to have lived in the country for several
years (Thompson 2012). Both the Estonian and Latvian languages are significantly
different from Russian, which made passing the language test a difficult feat, especially for the Russians who, prior to Estonian and Latvian independence, had not
been required to learn the native language of these countries. Moldova's citizenship
law, on the other hand, granted citizenship to those who desired it if they had been
"residing permanently on the territory of the republic [before June 23, 1990) and
had there a permanent place of work or other legal source of existence" (Gasca 2012).
Moldova's more inclusive legislature benefited and empowered its minority groups.
In the Baltics, non-citizens were denied many jobs, including service in the
military, teaching positions, and work within private industries. Judicial proceedings were done in the native languages of these countries, and only citizens could
vote in national elections, which denied Russians from joining parties to change this
law (Thompson 2012). Estonia and Latvia effectively disenfranchised their Russian
minorities through these laws. Unlike the situation in Moldova where the Gaguaz
and Transnistria regions gained power in government to push for their independence and effect politics, ethnic Russians became second-class citizens in these Baltic States and held essentially no power to bring about more favorable political
reforms. The language laws that had accommodated Russian speakers in Moldova
were non-existent in the Baltics, further allowing Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to
keep pro-Russian groups from having legitimacy or gaining political leverage. By
more thoroughly suppressing their ethnic Russian minorities, the Baltics avoided
their own Transnistrian movements.

Conclusion
Moldova's historical entanglement with Romania and Russia even before the Soviet
era made independence a more difficult process than it was for states such as Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia, which found more support from the West to value independence
and nationalism. Overall, as soon as the Baltics gained independence, elites pursued a
policy of "regional revival," including the use of their native languages in schools, for
citizenship laws, employment, and access to the government and services (Laitin 1991).
Additionally, these countries adopted symbols of their national culture through the celebration of historic holidays, national media, the changing of city and street names from
Russian to native names, and independence movements, such as Lithuania's Sajudis
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movement that sprung up in 1988-89 (Laitin 1991). These policies reversed the changes
that had been implemented during the Soviet era and resembled Moldovan policies
of promoting "symbols of our people" and favoring the native language over Russian speakers. The Baltics, however, were more drastic in their policies and also moved
further away from the Russian sphere of influence by establishing new currencies in
order to avoid reliance on the Russian ruble and refusing to join the Commonwealth of
Independent States (OS), unlike Moldova, which joined in December 1991. Moldova's
decision to join the OS gave Russia political and economic leverage over the state, an
additional advantage for ethnic Russian minorities.
While Moldova erased certain Soviet holidays from their calendars, the Baltics
did so as well but went even further by celebrating their national independence days
from the year 1918, thereby relegating the Soviet period as an unfortunate anomaly
in their histories of being independent states. Indeed, unlike Moldova, these states
implemented extremely harsh anti-Russian policies and chose to turn to the West
quickly and decisively. These decisions allowed them to reestablish their unique
national identities separate from Russia and without secessionist movements, despite
the fact that Estonia and Latvia both had larger populations of Slavs than Moldova
did upon independence (though the large populations of ethnic Russians helped to
increase their fears and, therefore, the harshness of their policies toward the minority
group). Additionally, unlike Romania, the Baltics' western neighbors did not seek for
unification with the states but rather supported their desires to become integrated
with Western Europe. The Baltics' strong German heritage that viewed Slavs as a
lesser people made choosing to cleanse themselves of ties to Russia an easy choice.
Moldova's former ties to both Romania and the Soviet Union made deciding upon
a national identity a more difficult process. While some-particularly Russian-speaking
minorities-in the country wanted to maintain ties with Russia, others sought to
establish a unique Moldovan identity while yet others pushed for reunification with
Romania. The pro-Romanian movement gained some support during the early years
leading up to independence and for a time afterward, but it eventually exacerbated
tensions among the pro-Russia and pro-Moldova movements, leading to abandonment of hope for the reunification process.
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